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T.H. Marshall’s classic text: “Citizenship and Social Class”, in which he 
discusses the interconnectedness of civil, political, and social rights, sti-
pulates a positive relationship between democracy and social inclusion. 
The former provides a basis on which the losers of —socially polarizing— 
market processes can claim and obtain social rights.
In fact, the experience of Western Europe exhibits an evolutionary pat-
tern with regard to the expansion of the right to vote, followed by the 
expansion of the welfare state, which led to a marked decrease in income 
and wealth disparities in society. Marshall’s insight that the exercising 
of civil and political rights must be supplemented by additional social 
rights has become an unquestioned normative tenet in the industrialized 
countries. This seems to confirm the notion of a causal link between de-
mocratic participation rights and the granting of social rights.
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investigación comparativos sobre desigualdad social y estrategias de desa-
rrollo en América Latina.
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Latin America Does Not Fit the Theory of Democratic Inclusion
However, this causal link does not seem to exist in Latin America. At the 
beginning of the twenty­first century and, thus, after three decades of 
democracy, Latin America still has the world’s highest rates of inequality 
(together with Sub-Saharan Africa). In fact, high rates of inequality can 
be considered as a long-standing Latin American characteristic, encoun-
tered throughout the region (Lopez/Perry 2008).
It is true that, in recent years, there have been slight decreases in social 
inequality. In 2009, however, after five years of economic prosperity, the 
level of inequality was 60 percent higher in Latin America than in the 
OECD countries overall. Even Costa Rica and Uruguay, for a long time 
the two Latin American countries with the lowest income disparities, 
considerably exceed the levels reached by highly unequal Western Eu-
ropean and East Asian states (ECLAC 2009; UNDP 2009; Bourguignon/
Morrison 2002): more than 30 percent of the population live in poverty. 
Many have no or only insufficient access to medical care or education. 
The 15 percent of the population who have escaped poverty in recent 
years sometimes eke out a living which is barely above the poverty line 
and without social protection, completely dependent on the performance 
of the national economy and hence with the constant risk of once more 
sliding back down the social scale (ECLAC 2009). The significant income 
and asset disparities in Latin America can be related to structural factors, 
which over generations have reproduced inequalities (De Ferranti et al. 
2004; World Bank 2006).
Obviously, the Latin American states have not managed to ensure wi-
de-ranging social inclusion through liberal, representative democracies, 
which have now been in place for three decades. This calls into question 
the proposition that democracies are more sensitive to the wishes and 
needs of the population. According to this proposition, the expansion of 
the right to vote to a mainly poor population should have moved socio-
political issues to the center of politics. In fact, in opinion polls three-
quarters of the Latin American population regularly emphasize that the 
income distribution in their countries is unfair or very unfair, yet no sig-
nificant improvements have been achieved (ECLAC 2009).
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Democratic Deficit Theories Are Not Convincing
In order to explain this paradox some argue that the inequalities are due 
to political regime deficits. It is maintained that political­legal equality it-
self is not fully­fledged, despite democracy. Consequently, the expansion 
of social rights is also hindered. Of particular importance with regard to 
this interpretation is the regime analysis approach, which is influenced by 
the liberal idea of democracy in terms of which the individual quest for 
freedom promotes freedom for all. In addition, Joseph A. Schumpeter’s 
model of democracy (1942) and Robert A. Dahl’s concept of “polyarchy” 
(1971, 1989) are taken into account. For both, institutionalized competi-
tion is decisive in guaranteeing political freedom. Therefore, this appro-
ach focuses on the quality of elections. The regime analysis approach is, fur-
thermore, influenced by Max Weber’s concept of power and the various 
institutional underpinnings of legitimate rule.
Thus, much research on Latin American democracies concentrates on 
the institutional design of government and on the regulation of politi-
cal participation. It focuses on actors such as elites, political parties, and 
other associations. The deliberative aspects of democracy, as well as the 
effectiveness of structural factors, are treated as subordinate (for a critical 
treatment, see: Burchardt 2009; Carothers 2002). The focus on the formal 
aspects of political participation guided decades of empirical — often 
quantitative and comparative — investigation, which took Western de-
mocracies as the point of reference and by design arrived at the conclu-
sion that Latin American democracies are diminished subtypes of the 
occidental model (Collier/Levitsky, 1995), that they have “defects,” and 
that citizenship is of “low intensity” (O’Donnell, 1999). 
But even if the quality of democracies is measured by these standards it 
must be noted that Latin America performs rather well in terms of po-
litical freedom in comparison to other regions, such as Eastern Europe 
(Freedom House 2009). Furthermore, the United Nations Development 
Program concluded in a long-term study that most of the elections in 
the region can be classified as “free and fair” and that they even include 
improved opportunities of political participation for disadvantaged cate-
gories, such as women and indigenous people (PNUD 2004). Moreover, 
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in some policy fields, such as participatory budgeting, the region featu-
res new forms of civil participation which can act as examples for other 
regions. 
While the deficient formalization and institutionalization of democratic 
processes in Latin America undoubtedly affects freedom and political/
legal equality it cannot really explain the eye-catching persistence of so-
cial inequalities. An extension of the analytical focus seems necessary.
The Exclusive Character of the Latin American Welfare State
Another approach focuses on the deficits of the Latin American welfare 
state. To start with, this approach has to accommodate the fact that, in a 
number of countries, the creation of a welfare state began relatively early 
and that in Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina social benefits such as 
health care, education, maternity protection and unemployment insuran-
ce were introduced — often with a universal design — with the begin-
ning of import-substituting industrialization in the 1930s (Wehr, 2009).
At the time, the social policies of the region were influenced by the Wes-
tern example, in particular the Bismarckian Model. They were linked to 
formal wage labor and served as integrating mechanisms for the rising 
classes of white-and blue-collar workers. Social security systems were 
accompanied by upward social mobility and secured, in their 1950s he-
yday, social benefits and rights for up to 60 percent of the population, de-
pending on the country (Mesa-Lago 1978). Despite its later cutbacks and 
retrenchments, this social policy is still present today in various aspects 
(Barrientos, 2004).
Moreover, in terms of resources, Latin American welfare systems cannot 
be classified as chronically underfunded. During the period of import­
substituting industrialization, a remarkable expansion of social policy 
took place in many countries and was often consolidated at a high level. 
After the cutbacks in the wake of the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s, 
social benefits began to increase slightly again in the 1990s. Today, the 
social spending of many Latin American states approximates 15 percent 
of GDP and accounts for half of total public spending (ECLAC 2009). 
Countries such as Costa Rica and Uruguay have a level of social spen-
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ding comparable to that of Switzerland and Norway (Segura-Ubiergo, 
2007; Wehr, 2009).
However, Latin American social policy has always been extremely selec-
tive. From the beginning it relied on a vertical integration strategy which 
consisted of improving benefits for the already insured population ins-
tead of expanding coverage horizontally. Formally employed urban 
labor benefited most from the periods of expansion, while the (mainly 
rural) poor remained excluded. Additionally, vertical integration gave 
rise to strong centralization, high administrative costs, and misallocation. 
Furthermore, it promoted clientelistic and paternalistic policies on the 
part of political parties and governments (Mesa-Lago 1985). The focus 
on men as the main providers did not match the real work and living 
conditions of many families, with their high incidence of female provi-
ders. Altogether, the Latin American welfare states were, even in periods 
of prosperity, unable to reduce social inequality to a significant degree. 
“Two-thirds societies” remained the best that could be achieved (Franco, 
1996).
The neoliberal reforms of the 1980s, which emphasized directly addres-
sing the neediest were not completely unsuccessful. In modified form, 
they are still in place in many countries of the region which are now 
governed by left-wing governments (Burchardt 2007). Nonetheless, they 
deepened even further the existing social inequalities. The reason was 
that they went hand in hand with increasing flexibilization and seg-
mentation of the labor market, which drove many into the informal eco-
nomy, with its “iron law” of supply and demand — also with regard to 
manpower. The rise of informality meant increasing poverty, inequality, 
and political powerlessness (Mesa-Lago 1994; Perry et Al. 2007; UNDP 
2004). Welfare cuts also affected parts of the middle class, while a privi-
leged few were able to maintain their social rights (Haggard/Kaufman, 
2008). 
To date, it is the higher income classes who have profited most from Latin 
American welfare systems, which are financed to a considerable extent 
by indirect taxes, burdening those outside the social security net (Huber 
et al. 2009). In Europe, every social quintile receives roughly 20 percent of 
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social spending, while in Latin America about 70 percent of the welfare 
benefits are concentrated on the top 10 percent of the population; in the 
regressive pension sector the figure is 80 percent (Wehr 2009). In turn, 
the poorest parts of the population do not even have guaranteed access 
to basic social services. Even in the country with the most egalitarian sys-
tem, Costa Rica, the bottom income quintile receives a mere 12 percent of 
social spending. Thus, the welfare system exacerbates inequalities rather 
than reduces them (Goñi et al. 2008, Wehr, 2009).
This system, which tends to reproduce inequality, has been legitimized 
democratically for three decades. We must therefore suspect that these 
democracies’ institutional setting prevents the effective social participa-
tion of the majority of the population, in spite of political/legal equality. 
Social inequality, poverty, and electoral democracy seem to generate a 
specific “Latin American Triangle” (PNUD 2004), in which liberal demo-
cracy does not promote social participation but legitimizes inequality. 
Now, it is known that in extremely unequal societies the socially privile-
ged exert much more influence on democratic processes than weak social 
groups. This, in turn, generates the formation of authoritarian relations 
(Huber et al. 2009; Nel, 2005). As a result, liberal democracy could beco-
me its own gravedigger. It is in this respect that the question of inequality 
is linked to the question of democracy.
Entitlements and Endowments: The Shortcomings of Liberal Theory
Not only democracy, but also the various economic development models 
applied in Latin America in the course of the twentieth century have had 
a limited impact on social inequality. This suggests that the reproduction 
of social inequality originates in the realm of political power, unaltered 
by the existence of consolidated democracies. This once more raises the 
question of how political participation and social inequality are connec-
ted.
This question has been a theme of liberal theory for some time. For Amar-
tya Sen (1997), economic entitlements, social opportunities and social ca-
pabilities jointly ensure the realization of individual liberties. He defi-
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nes entitlements, opportunities and capabilities as liberties and declares 
that their absence constitutes a lack of freedom. With this methodologi-
cal “sleight of hand,” Sen integrates socio-economic factors into liberal 
theory.
Similar to Sen, John Rawls stresses in his political philosophy (1971) that 
an individual’s opportunities depend very much on social factors, which 
thus become crucial for inequality. For Rawls, it is important to have rules 
that (i) guarantee procedural justice and (ii) provide “justice as fairness.” 
He adds to the liberal primacy of individual freedom and political-legal 
equality the dimension of a “fair equality of opportunity.”
However, such attempts to include social factors in the liberal theory of 
democracy find themselves confronted by an acute problem: they still act 
on the assumption that individuals act on a rational-utilitarian basis and 
strive primarily for maximum freedom. The original formation of talents 
or competences takes place outside the system in which distributive jus-
tice is organized. Not the emergence of competence, but its promotion is 
the focus of a desirable public order. This promotion must be enabling 
and provide access to positions (and perhaps resources) via democratic 
procedures creating basic equality of opportunities.
Liberal approaches exclude from consideration those structural forces 
that shape both individual objectives and capabilities and thus circums-
cribe the exercise of individual freedom. These forces are located to a lar-
ge extent in the domains of the family, religion, or work. The formative 
power of these domains is hardly touched upon in liberal theory, with its 
emphasis on procedures.
The expansion of social rights should not focus primarily on individual 
enabling processes and the democratization of access, but instead on the 
material and intellectual strengthening of disadvantaged milieus and 
communities. Endowments are of crucial importance. Their distribution 
sets a limit on what entitlements can achieve. It is in terms of material 
and intellectual endowments that those power asymmetries which res-
trict the exercise of formal rights are minimized (Cohen 1995). On this 
understanding, democratic participation needs redistribution so that a 
“participatory parity” (Fraser 2003) can be established. 
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The Concept of Social Democracy and Its Individualistic Bias
Reflections of this kind, as well as the observations of T.H. Marshall, are 
also relevant with regard to the concept of “social democracy.” The basic 
insight here is that human equality is not a fact and that democracy on its 
own does not bring it about. “True” democracy must be conceived of as 
a political constitution, which assures its citizens not only political-legal 
equality, but also social inclusion (Heller 1971a, 1971b). The approach 
of “social democracy” completes liberal theory with the dimension of 
social participation rights. It assigns to the democratic state the duty of 
guaranteeing, through social policies, the necessary distribution of cru-
cial endowments. Liberty and equality are considered as two sides of the 
same coin in the concept of “social democracy.” Liberty does not ensure 
equality, but a minimum level of equality is the precondition of liberty 
for all.
Like their liberal counterparts, however, current notions of “social demo-
cracy” focus on the individual and the consensus reached between indi-
viduals. They must be completed by a non-essentialist understanding of 
democracy and society. If the essence of (social) democracy is understo-
od not as an aggregated expression of a political consensus, which is ba-
sed on individual rationality and created for the overcoming of conflicts, 
but as a special form of establishing and dealing with social antagonisms, 
then the floor is open for a wide range of new theories and analyses (La-
clau/Mouffe 1985).
Going beyond the focus on the individual, democracy can be understood 
as a specific relationship between different collective identities, which 
implies that the — not necessarily only rational — actions of these iden-
tities have to be taken into account. On the other hand, political power 
is to be considered from a dynamic perspective, as a continuous and in-
superable simultaneity of reciprocity and antagonism (Laclau/Mouffe 
1985). On this view, every social order is the result of sedimented poli-
tical procedures, which are, due to their underlying antagonism, always 
based on some form of exclusion. Marshall’s theory of the welfare state 
provides an excellent example: according to him, the welfare state arises 
as a national class compromise among originally incompatible interests. 
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This compromise is stabilized through political and social rights, but has 
to be adjusted anew, time and time again. 
Focusing on the Structures of Social Exclusion
For a full understanding of equality and inequality, the categories of “so-
cial democracy” should be integrated into an encompassing theory of 
democracy. Such a theory should extend its focus beyond the democra-
tic institutions to encompass also the social mechanisms which obstruct 
integration and the characteristics of the democratically organized and 
legitimated exclusion of certain collectives. In reversal of Fraser, the con-
vergence between democracy and inequality in Latin America could be 
understood as “participatory disparity.”
This means that evident asymmetric power relations, such as corruption 
or clientism, are not simply deficit phenomena but inherent mechanisms 
of power. The frequently described grey areas of democracy are not “de-
fects”; we rather find in them the crucial mechanisms that block or stimu-
late social participation. So far, Eurocentric tunnel vision (which, for that 
matter, neglects post-communist Eastern Europe) has tended to exclu-
de them from consideration. A more appropriate analytical perspective 
would direct attention to the question of which actors, and with which 
interests, promote or constrain welfare policies and through which me-
chanisms and institutions (Wehr, 2010). 
How the economy works is of considerable importance in this regard. 
Over the past few decades, the view has prevailed that the interplay 
of private property and the free market promotes general welfare and 
should be left to its own devices (Heritage Foundation 2009; Mandel-
baum 2007). The term “market democracy” (BTI 2006) dominated the 
agenda. The insight — formerly discussed by classical thinkers about de-
mocracy such as Dahl (1989) — that (economic) privacy not only protects 
the individual but also can evolve into a residuum of non-democratic 
power, was neglected. Economic dynamics were mainly ignored in the 
analysis of democracy.
However, the empirical experience of Latin America did not validate the 
promise of the free market. From the 1980s on, neoliberal reforms gener-
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ated only low growth rates and dramatically worsened the social situa-
tion of large parts of the population (Harvey 2005; Serra/Stiglitz 2008). 
Poverty and social inequality increased due to the flexibilization and seg-
mentation of labor markets, the privatization of social security and cuts 
in public services.
At the same time, interest representative organizations representing dis-
advantaged social groups were weakened, while the economic elite was 
able to increase its political influence (Teichman 2008; World Bank 2006). 
Extreme income disparities and poverty are usually correlated with 
various forms of discrimination. They encourage clientism between the 
privileged and the subordinate. This jeopardizes political rights and may 
limit social rights (PNUD 2004).
While the question of social rights is of special importance, neither recent 
democracy and inequality studies nor the actual reform policies of left-
wing governments — independently of their orientation (Roberts, 2008) 
— have set noteworthy trends. Nevertheless, important steps have been 
taken that may extend social rights significantly. The list includes land 
reform, the support of local production structures, the extension of ful-
ly­fledged health protection to the countryside and the informal sector, 
high-quality universal education, stronger regulation of foreign inves-
tors to national policies and more effective taxation of the wealthy.
Latin American tax revenues are outrageously low by international com-
parison. The elites are chronically undertaxed and in most countries tax 
systems are strongly regressive. They rely heavily on indirect taxation of 
consumption, with direct income or profit taxes accounting for only five 
percent of tax revenues (Goñi et al. 2008).
The design of labor relations is of equal importance: the (frequently pre-
carious) access to jobs is still one of the central factors generating inequal-
ity in the region. Depending on the country, between 30 and 60 percent 
of the working population works in the informal economy, without 
minimum wages, work standards and social protection (ECLAC 2009). 
Nevertheless, Latin American labor relations have been neglected for 
more than two decades by the research community. Also of consider-
able importance in Latin America is the relationship between (frequently 
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deteriorating) local ecological conditions and the market and subsistence 
opportunities of local producers.
In the past, economic growth and stricter regulation were often postu-
lated as a vehicle for the expansion of social rights. However, experi-
ence shows that this can lead to even more social inequality as the gap 
between formal and informal labor widens. What is badly needed is a 
deeper understanding of the structures and dynamics of Latin America’s 
informal economy. 
The need to reduce social inequality in Latin America is much more than 
a normative postulate: the issue will be decisive for the future of democ-
racy in the region. This insight might facilitate coalitions (including seg-
ments of the middle class) that undertake the far-reaching structural re-
forms that so far have been successfully vetoed by the elites — in alliance 
with the middle class and often enough also with urban labor. Adapted 
to Latin American social reality, social democracy must be reconceived 
with a strong rural bias and an emphasis on those labor and power rela-
tions that cannot be reached by conventional labor legislation.
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